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FIXING UP THE WORLD: GATT AND THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION 
Alan Freeman 
University of Greenwich 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper, published in Labour Focus on Eastern Europe , Number 59, 1998. pp 74-93 and 
reproduced in a number of journals and books, examines the consequences for world trade of 
the restructuring – commonly termed ‘globalisation’ that arose out of the Uruguay round of 
the GATT and let to the reconstruction of the World Trade Organisation in its present form, 
beginning in 1982. 
It establishes that the widely-held view of the system of world trade as a symmetric free trade 
system is largely mythical. It shows, on the basis of a study of the outcome of disputes within 
the GATT over the critical period in which the present world trading system was founded, 
that decisive non-market advantages were established by dominant continental trading blocs 
organised around NAFTA, the EEC and APEC, which as Stiglitz at the time explained, ‘tilted 
the playing field’ systematically in favour of these blocs. 
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University of Greenwich 
PRELUDE: THE SHORT SUCCESS STORY OF THE POLISH GOLF-CART INDUSTRY 
A story told by World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz aptly explains the new world 
economic order. It begins early this decade, with liberalisation the watchword of the moment. 
Polish industrialists, imbued with enthusiasm for the new free-market model, surveyed the 
options for exports and located a significant opportunity: the US golfing community. Poland, 
they discovered, could make cheap and robust carts which sold well; market reforms 
obviously had their up side.  
Unfortunately, not for the US golf-cart industry.  
A remedy was to hand: US dumping regulations outlaw the import of any good below its 
‘normal value’ if it damages US producers. Normal value is defined as the sale price in the 
exporting country, but golf-carts were not a common item in a land where half the population 
was starving. A second possible approach, though a concession to heterodoxy, is to define 
normal value as the cost of production. However since Poland’s market reforms were 
incomplete it was by definition not competitive, and therefore the domestic production cost 
could not be a benchmark. 
Since Poland’s economic advisors were busily explaining that Poland could only be efficient 
as a market economy, one might be excused for thinking this cost might be greater than its 
‘normal value’. However, Congress is a practical body, and applied its standard procedure, 
which was to identify a country with conditions comparable to Poland and ascertain the cost 
of producing golf-carts in that country. The choice, after careful consideration … Canada. 
Obvious, once one thinks about it, despite the minor drawback that Canada does not have a 
golf-cart industry. 
Nothing daunted, Congress duly adopted the following definition: the normal value of a 
Polish golf cart is the price at which it would be produced in Canada, if it made golf-carts. It 
then applied a punitive tariff on all imports of Polish golf-carts equal to the difference 
between this, and their sale price in the USA.  
And so ended the Polish export success that never was. 
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THE SLEEPING POLICEMAN OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
In this brief anecdote we have, in a nutshell, the reality of modern world trade. Whatever the 
free-trade rhetoric, the reality is something very different. In order to understand both why 
and how this is, we focus neither on the abstract theory of world trade nor on the enormously 
complex system of exchanges which make it up. Instead, we look at the politics of it. When 
we do so, we find a radical restructuring not just of the extent of world trade but of the 
institutions that govern it and the rules by which they function. At the centre of this 
restructuring stands a new international organisation: this article is a brief encounter with the 
myths, and the realities, of that body. 
Think of the world economy, and two household words come to mind: the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the two supranational bodies created by the Bretton 
Woods Treaty of 1947 when the allied powers constructed the postwar economic world order. 
It is less well-known that these two have been joined by another. The World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), formed in 1994 as a result of the 1986 ‘Uruguay Round’ of 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has emerged as the 
third pillar of the postwar economic order. Although generally presented as a simple 
continuation of GATT, its has in fact inaugurated a fundamental change in the organisation of 
world trade.  
The GATT has been transformed from an ineffectual chamber of commerce into a powerful 
device for restructuring the world market in the commercial and financial interests of the 
leading powers, the core requirement being to maintain the supremacy of the US economy in 
the face of the largest trade deficit in world history. 
It is supposed to expand world trade, generally perceived as a positive and harmless general 
benefit to all nations. But whatever the free-trade rhetoric, its actual role is to integrate the 
non-aligned and former Eastern bloc nations into an unrestricted market for the products of a 
select club of advanced nations; to suppress national sovereignty in favour of institutional 
guarantees for the systematic plunder of this market, and to grant this same club immunity 
from every competitive threat which might result. 
The control of trade has emerged from the entrails of the world market to claim its place, 
alongside financial blackmail and debt-slavery, as a primary instrument of advanced-country 
domination. 
THE NEW TRADE AGENDA 
The WTO enshrines a radical new agenda in world trade. Its cornerstones are: 
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(a) liberalising ‘services’ through GATS (General Agreements on Trade and Services) 
covering one-fifth of all world trade ($1 trillion). This is an institutional change 
masquerading as trade reform. Since financial services are treated as a ‘commodity’ it 
encapsulates a legal obligation to free capital movement, overriding the legitimate right to 
national economic sovereignty. Moreover the definition of exports has been extended in 
the case of services to include production by foreign-owned subsidiaries in the host 
country. Trade regulation has thus been extended for the first time to the internal market 
régimes of member states. 
(b) a decisive new trade category of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). IPRs have as much 
to do with trade liberalisation as the free transport of slaves. They  outlaw trade in 
products embodying any technology less than twenty years old – that is, almost 
everything – except as specified by the current owner of the technology. They are an 
absolute monopoly of the advanced countries: 0.16% of world patents are currently 
owned by third world residents.1  They make the owner of a technical process a separate 
legal entity distinct not only from the labourer but also the factory or farm-owner and the 
original inventor. They transform the ownership and control of technology into a 
marketable instrument of domination. They set in concrete the principal market 
mechanism that impoverishes the third world, namely the transfer of technological super-
profit through trade. 
(c) large-scale anti-dumping (AD) actions as the preferred protectionist device of the USA, 
EEC and Australia/New Zealand, a practice baldly described by the World Bank as ‘a 
packaging of protectionism to make it look like something different’.2 As HK remark 
(p178): “AD is not about fair play. Its goal is to tilt the playing field”. Before 1986, anti-
dumping actions were exceptional events. By 1992 they were universal advanced-country 
practice. 1040 anti-dumping actions were initiated by the industrialised countries between 
1985 to 1992, over half directed against either Eastern Europe (132), the third world (137) 
or the developing Asian countries (297). The non-industrialised countries – three-quarters 
of the world’s people – initiated a grand total of 91. 
(d) the consolidation of a system of trading blocks – ‘Free Trade Areas’ around the dominant 
capitalist countries – the EC, NAFTA and APEC – with specific exemption from the 
measures imposed on all other WTO members. Though article XXIV of the GATT 
proposes stringent conditions that a Free Trade Area must satisfy, these are never applied. 
                                                     
1
 Mihevic 1995 
2
 Hoekman and Kostecki (1995). From now on this is abbreviated to (HK) 
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As of 1990, only four working parties (of a total of over fifty) could agree that any 
regional agreement satisfied Article XXIV, three of these before 1957. “The GATT’s 
experience in testing FTAs (free Trade Areas) and customs unions against Article has not 
been very encouraging...It is not much of an exaggeration to say that GATT rules [on 
regional agreements] were largely a dead letter” (HK 219). In short, the advanced 
countries do what the hell they like. 
FROM CONSENSUS TO COMPULSION 
This disparate series of changes is being cemented by converting a treaty organisation – the 
old GATT –  into a supranational enforcement organisation that imposes and legislates not 
just trading relations but the internal property, tax and subsidy régimes of its members. 
GATT held protracted ‘rounds’ of multi-party negotiations aimed at the mutual reduction of 
specific tariffs, subject to consensus. In effect, it was a brokering organisation for extending 
the bilateral arrangements which the big players would have made in any case to a slightly 
wider circle of participants. “In instances where the choice was between risking serious 
conflict and attempting to enforce the letter of GATT disciplines – for example on regional 
integration or subsidies – the contracting parties generally ‘blinked’. In large part this reflects 
the nature of the institution, which is basically a club. The club has rules, but its members can 
decide to waive them, or pretend not to see violations.” (HK:3) 
Although historians see the GATT as the principal vehicle of trade liberalisation, this was in 
large measure because the major powers, under US hegemony, wanted to liberalise their own 
trade in any case to secure a share of exported US capital during the period when it still 
enjoyed industrial supremacy. GATT simply invited the others along for the ride. 
The WTO marked two decisive changes. Firstly it moved from ‘result-orientation’ to ‘rule-
orientation’; trade was now governed by laws and formulas instead of targetted commodities. 
This extends to legal trade regulations which the WTO obliges member governments to write 
into their own laws. Most significantly, these rules are now policed. 
“Formerly the GATT was not an international organization (i.e. a legal entity in its own right) 
but an inter-governmental treaty. As a result, instead of ‘member states’ GATT had 
‘contracting parties’...The WTO is an international organization that administers multilateral 
agreements pertaining to trade in goods (GATT), trade in services (GATS), and trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights.” (HK:23) 
If a member country breaches a WTO regulation, an enforcement process is triggered and 
consensus is required not to implement sanctions but to prevent them. If a third-world country 
seeks exemption to protect its industries or agricultural producers from competition from the 
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technologically more advanced Northern countries, it faces co-ordinated, punitive trade 
sanctions from all WTO members. 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD MARKET 
What makes such threats effective is a systematic expansion of GATT and the WTO which 
has culminated in the re-establishment of a global world market previously sundered in two 
by the outcome of the Russian revolution, two World Wars and the Chinese revolution.  
GATT was a minority club with a mere 23 signatories. The balance of forces was so weak 
that it proved impossible to establish the international trade organisation (ITO), called for in 
the Bretton Woods agreements. In the 1949 ‘Annecy’ round of negotiations a mere 11 
countries took part. China withdrew in 1950 and the US, which had followed a fiercely 
protectionist stance between the wars, abandoned the attempt to secure congressional 
ratification of the ITO. Though the initial 1947 agreement secured a 21% reduction in US 
tariffs, the next three rounds secured only a further 8.4% reduction. 
The term ‘free trade’ has never appeared on GATT’s formal agenda. The GATT-1947 
preamble calls for ‘raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the 
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods’. The principal 
mechanism was to reduce tariffs and eliminate discriminatory treatment. 
No planned economy took part until 1967 when Poland joined, and the third world countries 
succeeded in neutralising or blocking the application of the GATT trade agreements to 
themselves through the non-aligned movement and the 1964 establishment of UNCTAD – the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – which was formed to press for trade 
measures to benefit developing countries. The ‘Kennedy Round’ of 1963 involved 74 
countries and spun out for four years. The practice of picking and choosing which GATT 
regulations to implement was so widespread it was nicknamed ‘GATT à la carte’. The ‘Tokyo 
round’ of 1973 involved 99 countries but lasted six years and was obliged to legalise 
preferential tariff and non-tariff treatment in favour of developing countries.  
Thus though the developing countries were drawn into GATT’s orbit, access to a separate 
economic system in the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries offered them an important degree 
of autonomy. Though governed (and impoverished) by the world market they could veto 
many imperialist proposals, imposing selective controls on trade to protect domestic 
producers, and limiting the drain of capital brought on by unequal exchange, because they 
could always resort to (or threaten) trade with the Soviet or Chinese blocs instead. The ‘Third 
World’ – a term coined by Mao Tse-Tung – took part in trade negotiations, but acted 
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collectively to veto or water down measures that damaged domestic producers, offsetting – 
though not overcoming – the impact of the world market on domestic accumulation. 
By the end of the Uruguay round, which began in 1986 and ended a gruelling eight years 
later, the scene had changed utterly. There were now 128 member countries including most 
former Eastern European countries. The former USSR no longer presented an effective 
alternative outlet or supplier. Aggressive ‘threat-based’ US policies, the debt crisis and the 
draconian intervention of the IMF with its structural adjustment, export-oriented programmes, 
produced the ‘neoclassical counter-revolution’ (Todaro 1994:85). Keynesians were replaced 
on the leading world financial institutions, and wave after wave of neoliberal advisors and 
political regimes came to the fore in development economics and in the third world countries 
themselves. Resistance gave way to capitulation; the new order had arrived. 
DIVERGENCE, BIG TIME 
What are the material consequences of this new economic régime? The most fundamental 
point to grasp is that free trade produces  inequality. The neo-classical doctrine of 
convergence predicts that in consequence of trade, the disparities between trading nations 
should disappear over time. The nearest adequate term for this idea is ‘cretinous’. No serious 
known fact supports it. 
Characterising 120 years of the world market as ‘Divergence, big time’, senior World Bank 
economist Lance Pritchett (1997:12) goes on to examine its more recent phase: 
“From 1980-1994, growth per capita GDP averaged 1.5 per cent in the advanced countries 
and 0.34 percent in the less developed countries. There has been no acceleration of growth in 
most poor countries, either absolutely or relatively, and there is no obvious reversal in 
divergence...taken together, these findings imply that almost nothing that is true about the 
growth rates of advanced countries is true of the developing countries, either individually or 
on average.” (Pritchett 1997:14) 
The dogma which informs the notion of convergence − the theory of comparative advantage − 
is false. It predicts that all nations will gain from trade. In fact in all trade there are losers and 
winners, and the greater the extent of the market, the wider the divergences between them 
become.  
This can be offset after a fashion by technical change, so that even with widening differences 
between nations, the absolute living standards of many nations can for certain periods 
improve, and this did happen to a degree after World War II. It was facilitated by the absence 
of generalised multilateral trade regulation, which meant individual nations could to a limited 
degree determine their own relation to the world market and offset some of its most damaging 
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effects. A small number − the ‘four tigers’ for example − were even able, on the basis of large 
capital inflows and (ironically for free-trade dogma) highly-regulated internal markets, above 
all labour markets − to begin catching up with the advanced powers. 
With the Reagan era and above all the arrival of the WTO, this window of opportunity 
vanished. Now, not only are relative differences between nations accelerating but a growing 
number of people face absolute declines in living standards, starvation, and ruin. Already in 
1990 Socialist Economic Bulletin #3 calculated that: 
• relative impoverishment had become the normal condition of three-quarters of the human 
race; by 1988 the proportion of the world population in market economies falling further 
behind the industrialised countries in GDP per capita, reached 75% compared with 46% 
in 1967; 
• a striking rise in absolute impoverishment; over the same period, the number of people 
living in countries registering an absolute decline in GDP per capita had risen twelve-
fold, from 71 million to 808 million. 
Chart 1 below shows the ratio between the GDP per capita of the richest 25% and the poorest 
25% of countries since 1970. It speaks for itself. 
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Chart 1: Rich and Poor since 1970
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 1995. GDP per capita in $, Atlas exchange-rate method. 
If unrestrained, the social conflicts generated by such an explosive differentiation would 
rapidly destabilise market relations. The nation-state provides an institutional framework to 
contain, ameliorate or suppress such antagonisms − fiscal redistribution, labour mobility, 
social solidarity in general or, if need be, repression. When conditions of relative uniformity 
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in living standards are found in a single nation, they thus arise not from the extension of the 
market but from the social and political counter-reactions which it generates and the external, 
political limits to which these give rise. 
In world trade these institutional factors mitigating the destructive solvent effects of the 
unrestricted market are largely absent. Nor can they be overcome by the geographical 
expansion of the richer nations; the prodigious redistribution of wealth required to create a 
genuine social solidarity is far beyond the threshold acceptable to the holders of private 
wealth, or indeed the competitive survival of their business. The absorption of the very small 
territory of East Germany, with a mere 17 million not very poor people, has driven the richest 
country in Europe from surplus to deficit for over a decade, called forth one of the greatest 
fiscal transfers since Marshall Aid, and with more unemployed than in the Weimar Republic, 
has still not resolved the resulting rampant antagonisms. 
The only ultimate solution is the abolition of all national barriers, but the market acts in the 
opposite direction, as is evident from the explosion of new nations that accompanied − and 
resulted from − the new trade era imposed by the USA via the WTO − as the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and of the former Soviet Union bears vivid testimony. 
The formation of any larger blocs or units of the rich nations is a consequence of, and depends 
on, the extent to which they can cement their own classes around the plunder of the poorer 
nations. What they require, therefore, is access to the markets of these nations without any 
reciprocation. Free Trade is not only a myth, but a lie. 
The world market thus itself calls into being nation-states and just as surely pitches them into 
conflicts whose result, twice this century already, has been global war. This sets absolute 
limits on what it can achieve. It is therefore one of the principal modern forms in which the 
market throws up barriers to itself, alongside the creation of social classes. In particular, it 
leads to the division of the world of remarkable persistence, which has lasted more or less 
since the early 1870s to the present day, between a small bloc of very wealthy nations with a 
near-monopoly over technology, finance, commerce and the means of warfare, and everyone 
else in the world. This is the actual empirical consequence of the formation of a world market; 
what has to be grasped is that it is not an accident or deviation from the way the market works 
but on the contrary consists of the highest development to which the world market can attain. 
THE WTO AS INSTITUTIONAL POLICEMAN 
The re-consolidation of a universal world market is the surest guarantee of the impetuous 
descent into mass starvation and poverty of the mass of the world’s peoples. The only escape 
for any nation except the small club of leaders is to except itself, in one way or another, from 
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the general functioning of the market. This is why the old GATT could not be an enforcement 
agency and why the new WTO has to be an enforcement agency.  
The WTO is now the third arm of the IMF and the world Bank, who work in consort to 
impose a complete institutional policy framework on the world. The banks impose open 
markets and free trade as a condition of credit and debt relief. But free trade is defined to 
mean a definite institutional régime which overrides the economic sovereignty of all but the 
largest players. This includes not just full capitalist property rights and the free movement of 
capital but extends to taxes, subsidies or any  measure that can be construed as ‘unfair 
competition’ – that is, any element of state provision. 
The original GATT agenda sought to avert a repeat of the interwar breakup into hostile 
trading blocks, and prioritised ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘reciprocity’. Non-discrimination 
states that members must make the same trade concessions to all others as to their ‘most-
favoured nations’ (MFNs). Reciprocity states that there should be, in some (usually poorly-
defined) sense, an equality of loss, which implies an exchange of reductions in barriers. These 
principles could apply in a small club where they extended essentially bilateral agreements to 
a wider circle. But in any wider reduction the losses and gains for all partners cannot possibly 
be the same; there are losers and winners. This is why GATT functioned as it did, as a 
negotiating forum whose decisions were quite easy to avoid or bypass.  
With enforcement and ‘rule-based’ tariff reductions it becomes impossible to ensure that all 
parties benefit. Therefore, everyone seeks exceptions to the rules. The industrial powers have 
established two systematic procedures for imposing their exceptions. This is the recourse to 
anti-dumping legislation, coupled with the GATT provision that exempts ‘trading blocs’ from 
most GATT regulations. The third world and transition countries have in contrast lost almost 
all exceptions they could previously resort to. Moreover, the application of reciprocity is by 
nature asymmetrical between large and ‘small’ nations where ‘small’, it should be 
remembered, has to be translated into the language of money – in which India is one-fifth the 
size of the USA. As HK (163) note: “fundamentally, it is a fact of life that small economies 
(i.e. most developing countries) have little to bring to the negotiating table.” 
This is the background to two further principles which have risen to prominence with the 
WTO: ‘fair competition’ and ‘market access’. Under fair competition any non-market 
production – or indeed, any element of subsidy – of any good for export is immediately in 
violation of WTO principles.  
But the market access rule involves the most far-reaching consequences of institutional 
enforcement because of the role played by services, which characterise the new stage of 
capital exports. 50% of the global stock of foreign direct investment is now in services.  
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Most service activities can only be provided locally, so to reach foreign markets a service 
provider must locate in the host country. On US insistence, the WTO now provides that 
services provided by a foreign-owned subsidiary constitute exports and must be able to 
compete on a ‘level playing field’ with domestic producers. If generalised, this principle 
would mean, for example, that a US health company in the UK could initiate a GATT action 
against the UK for unfair competition by the NHS. 
This position is not yet settled. The G-10 group of larger developing countries opposed it 
vigorously, supported by UNCTAD which proposed to define trade in services as occurring 
only when the majority of value added is produced by non-residents; a labour-, in fact 
human-based criterion. It embodies the simple principle that a nation’s residents should 
determine what happens in their own economy. The US proposal, a property-based principle, 
asserts that the economic right of the owner overrules the political rights of the people. 
In 1990 Martin Khor Kok Peng (p37) accurately predicted that: “the [Uruguay] round is an 
attempt by transnational companies to establish sets of international laws that would grant 
them unprecedented unfetttered freedoms and rights to operate at will and without fear of new 
competitors almost anywhere in the world.” By 1994 the institutional structure for this vision 
was in place. 
CAGING THE OWL OF MINERVA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FREEDOM OF 
TRADE 
There has been a global world market before − at the turn of the century. When history 
repeats itself, it either brings new elements into being or transforms old ones so much that 
they become something else. The reconstruction of the world market has brought with it a 
new development in property relations: TRIPS or Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights, 
which seek to establish a world-wide market in knowledge. In a notable new conflict between 
the forces and relations of production: the words ‘extension of trade’ for the first time take on 
the actual meaning ‘restraint of trade’. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) emerged as a central aspect of a general US campaign on 
trade which Bhagwati (1993) designates ‘Aggressive Unilateralism’. This centred on section 
301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974, a keystone of US trade legislation. It was elaborated 
in sections 301 to 306 in 1984, and in sections 301 to 310 of the ‘Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act’ of 1988.  
Section 301 raised hackles because it provided for mandatory action in pursuit of the 
enforcement of GATT-agreed arrangements, even when GATT procedures had not been 
exhausted. The US thus set itself above the same international legal framework from which it 
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drew justification for its actions and the claims that its partners had trade obligations to it. The 
‘Super 301’ and ‘Special 301’ provisions raised this to a new level. Bhagwati (1993) records 
that  
“Super 301 required the US Trade representative to prepare an inventory of foreign 
trade barriers, establish a priority list of countries and their unreasonable practices, and 
then set deadlines for their removal by the foreign countries, and, should they fail to 
comply, for decisions on retaliation by the United States. Special 301 is similar in its 
time-bound approach but is addressed specifically to intellectual property rights” 
He goes on to remark that  
“Section 301 is characterised by the (wholly distinct) fact that it enables the United 
States to unilaterally make demands for trade concessions by others without offering 
any matching, reciprocal concessions of its own that others might demand in turn.” 
IPRs fall into three categories: trademark goods (designer and brand products), copyright 
goods (artistic materials) and patent goods (industrial processes and their products). 
Copyright law has been significantly extended to include software. Bringing these three 
categories together signifies, essentially, a generalised alienation of mental products and their 
transformation into a distinctly marketable entity. A patent, a copyright, or a trademark 
embodies the right to produce ‘something’ defined not by what it is or contains, but by the 
knowledge or information that distinguishes it. Software, the most advanced form of IPR, 
involves hardly any material product at all. What is actually sold is the legal right − or license 
− to use the software in your own production processes.  
IPRs, like GATS, defined trade barriers in terms of the internal legal régime. The USA 
explicitly sought , and through the WTO achieved, changes in the internal structures of its 
trading partners and rivals to harmonise their copyright and patent laws with its own, with a 
view to stamping out what it characterised as ‘piracy’; the production of copies. It abandoned 
the existing, bilateral structure for Intellectual Property safeguarded by the United Nations 
body known as the World International Property Organisation (WIPO) precisely because of 
this need. WIPO operated on the old GATT principle of non-discrimination; as Maskus 
(1993:82) delicately explains:  
“the prevailing policy principle in WIPO is national treatment, which requires countries 
not to discriminate between domestic and foreign firms in it IPRs. However, this 
principle does not prevent the level of protection from being weak if a particular 
country so desires.”  
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The USA sought to ensure that the country’s desires would not enter into the matter. Prior to 
the Uruguay round, India provided a seven-year patent protection for pharmaceutical 
production processes and none for pharmaceutical products; as a WTO member it becomes 
obliged to extend protection on both produces and processes to twenty. In plain English, the 
legislation makes it illegal for India to cure its sick, and deprives the Indian people of the 
sovereign right to do anything about it. 
This illustrates our second point: this extension of the market demands a restriction of 
production. US manufacturers were concerned, not to protect the US markets against floods 
of fake Gucci watches and pirate CDs, but to prevent other countries making these same or 
comparable products themselves for their own use. In 1989 the US exported $58.8 billion 
worth of goods sensitive to IPR, being 16.1% of its total exports whilst Brazil exported $2.0 
billion, that is, 0.2% of US imports, and imported $2.4 billion, that is 13.1% of its own 
imports.3 
IPRs thus created a new category of commodity: knowledge itself. The US compelled the 
world to make the communication or application of privately-owned knowledge a crime. 
Imitation was transformed from the sincerest form of flattery into the newest form of theft. 
The universal nature of this change, by no means restricted to a small hi-tech sector, is the 
transformation of agriculture, the occupation of more than half the people of the world. 
Among its profoundly reactionary consequences is an end to the self-sufficiency of world 
agricultural production. Producers are now obliged to abandon natural production from their 
own seed and pay premium prices for genetically engineered seeds; indeed these seeds are 
neutered so that do not reproduce.  
IPRs are justified in terms of reward for the work of innovation. But there is no reason to 
suppose, even in terms of orthodox theory, that the granting of a monopoly in a product 
should generate a reward that is in any way related to the work of creating the product. IPRs 
are a legal monopoly: a license to print money. The language itself used to describe their 
motivation is quite explicit about this:  
“If an innovation has economic value but is also easily imitated, competing firms 
would copy and sell it, earning a share of the potential profits. In perfectly competitive 
markets, enough duplication would emerge to eliminate all profits…Intellectual 
property rights attempt to correct this problem by providing an exclusive right, or 
monopoly, to the innovative firm to sell or use the product or technology. Patents, 
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trademarks, copyrights, and other IPRs limit market access to the innovation and raise 
its price.” (Maskus 1993:72) 
THE MARKET IN DOMINANCE: IPR, TECHNICAL CHANGE AND THE SOURCE OF 
INEQUALITY 
The new legislation is a product of a distinct phase in the development of technology, which 
is in principle no longer embedded in particular objects and processes. When the diffusion of 
knowledge was restricted by physical constraints, industrial knowledge did not pass rapidly 
from one producer to another because the real secrets of an industrial process were tied up in 
expensive equipment, specialist training, in ‘know-how’. The mere invention of a process was 
really only a tiny part of the creation of a new technology. 
Increasingly, however, the governance of automated systems resides in reproducible 
components − a piece of software or indeed a genome, which even reproduces itself. The 
divorce between the knowledge of a process, and the process itself, has turned technical 
innovation into an easily transmissible thing. The cost of reproducing a technical advance is 
an ever-smaller proportion of the cost of producing it in the first place. 
This interferes with an essential element of the motor of capitalist development. 
Technological change under capitalist conditions gives advanced industrial producers, selling 
into the same market as a backward producer, an excess or ‘super-profit’. If it costs me $20 to 
produce a product, and it costs you $5 to make the same product on account of your access to 
advanced machinery or software, then since we both sell our product for the same world 
price, you make $15 more than me for each item sold. The motor force of capital movement is 
the search for these surplus profits, and this is what drives innovation. 
The root cause of inequality is that given a free market in goods and capital, this surplus profit 
accumulates in the advanced nations. Clearly, if I do succeed in making my $15 excess profit, 
unless I am particularly profligate, I can re-invest it in further innovation so that by the time 
you have employed my new technology, I am already installing even more advanced 
equipment. This unequal exchange is the root of the growing gap between rich and poor, 
particularly when the state in the advanced nations acts as a military and legal guarantor of 
such capital transfers. The process of accumulation and technical change literally sucks the 
lifeblood from the poor nations. 
But if the technology can be passed on in a disc or a seed, the physical guarantees of this 
capital transfer are removed. The natural basis of superprofit is eroded and must be 
supplanted by a new, legal basis.  
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This world market in knowledge is a major and profoundly anti-democratic new stage of 
capitalist development. In this new and chilling stage, the application or even the 
communication of knowledge itself a violation of property rights. The WTO is transforming 
what was previously a universal resource of the human race – its collectively, historically and 
freely-developed knowledge of itself and nature – into a private and marketable force of 
production and, with the general imposition of IPRs in genetic material, removing the natural 
basis of the reproduction of food and with it the independent self-sufficiency of the planet. 
HUMAN RIGHTS VS PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND ITS 
CONTRADICTIONS 
Much of the policy debate has little contact with reality. It is widely assumed that : 
(a) universal free trade is inevitable; 
(b) globalisation is synonymous with it;  
(c) trade can be extended without limit. 
This gives many policy debates a very peculiar aspect, since they revolve around whether to 
endorse or reject something that is not actually happening. Whatever is going on, it is not free 
trade. No rich country chooses it, and no poor country is offered it. Insofar as the barriers to 
trade are destroyed, the basis of trade is undermined because the accelerated concentration of 
wealth which results incessantly destabilises the political and social order. 
Universal dogma to the contrary, all parties do not gain from it, not even the whole of a single 
nation. On the contrary, as Pritchett shows, the winners are few and the losers are many; and 
even in the winner states, the beneficiaries are unable to form a social class capable of 
advancing the nation as a whole.4 A striking proof is the very fact that the rich have erected 
such an armoury of defences against competition from their poorer rivals. If the gains from 
trade are so universal, why do even those who gain the most, circumvent it on such a scale? 
The terms in which the policy dilemma is always presented − as a choice between free trade 
or autarky − is thus simply out of touch with the real options. A reaction against autarky is 
both justified and understandable − it was directly responsible for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. But, in the new world order at least, autarky is not a choice but a punishment. Rule-
based, enforceable trade regulation means that sanctions − cutting a country off from the 
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 The Institute for Policy research (1997) reports that of the largest 100 economic entities in the world (counting 
nation states), 58 are global corporations and the sales of one alone − Wal-Mart Inc −exceeds the GDP of 158 
nations including Poland, Greece and Israel. Yet the combined employment of the top 200 corporations amounts to 
only 18.8 million people. 
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world market − are a regular instrument of policy. The very nations which for decades 
rejected sanctions against Apartheid as an unworkable infringement on commerce, now 
deploy them both as regular policy − for example against Iraq and Serbia − and use the threat 
of them, alongside debt servitude, as an instrument for securing favourable terms in trade 
negotiations. 
Sanctions can be an effective threat because it is today almost impossible to survive outside of 
the world economy. But it is currently impossible to take part in the world economy except 
through trade. Thus when any nation takes practical steps to defend the welfare of its people 
against the new world economic order, its immediate need is not to leave the world market, 
but to avoid being thrown out of it. Nations are no longer free to determine for themselves 
what relation they will have to the rest of the world. Multilateral trade treaties obligation have 
deprived them of a vital freedom: economic sovereignty. 
The fundamental choice is therefore not whether to orient the domestic economy into or out 
of the world market, but to find a foreign policy which defends the right to an independent 
domestic policy regardless of trade obligations. 
In the old GATT days the G-10 countries, at least, could to a limited degree choose how to 
take part in the world market. The rich nations were not cohesive enough to dictate to them. 
The non-aligned movement, UNCTAD, GATT ‘á la carte’ and the very fact that trade 
agreements were bilateral, all gave them limited freedom of action which let them offset, 
though not overcome, the destructive impact of trading from behind. 
This freedom of action has been removed. Thus whatever its economic form, the new world 
order is essentially a new political order. Though measured in money, its true cost of its 
restructuring is human, social and environmental. The doctrine of free trade, especially when 
extended to services, finances and knowledge, amounts to the following: that humans do not 
have the right to intervene in, and control, any aspect of their lives which has become a 
marketable instrument. But as everything becomes a commodity, all human and social 
relations are being marketed. The recent world conference on global warming shipwrecked on 
precisely the USA’s insistence on its right to trade in pollution. It is only a matter of time 
before the human genome itself is patented and, if the literal meaning of IPRs is applied, the 
commercial ownership of a human and all her descendants in perpetuity will become a 
legally-enforceable right. In short, the general extension of trade, quite contrary to Hayekian 
utopia, is synonymous with a general loss of freedom. 
Twenty years ago such human rights as care when ill, dignified old age, employment rights, 
education, and unfettered access to knowledge were so widely accepted that they entered 
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constitutions and charters of universal rights. Today they are unfair competition. The 
universal market is in direct formal contradiction with human rights. 
To produce one dollar’s worth of output, an Indian worker must now on average work eighty 
times longer than her or his American counterpart − twice as long, incidentally, as in 1980. If 
a band of military adventurers arrived on India’s shores, set up a prison camp and forced the 
local people to work under these conditions, it would probably provoke armed rebellion. Now 
the Indian government is obliged to impose the very same relations in the name of freedom. 
This principle, of the unequal exchange of labour, has always underpinned trade on account of 
concentration of advanced technique in the hands of the advanced producers. However a new 
factor is the remarkable extension of the commodity relation into spheres previously limited 
by the directness of human interaction − services, communication, and technical knowledge, 
or by the directness of the relation to nature and its reproductive processes − agriculture. This 
among other factors has propelled education, health, the care of the young and the old, the 
environment, and access to the fruits of knowledge, into the frontline of resistance. 
As long as the battle is kept out of the political terrain, these rights are surrendered without a 
shot. If it is illegal for a nation to determine its relation to the market, then it has no choice 
but to surrender human rights, because the market overrides its sovereign right to provide 
them. The conversion of social relations governed by politics into economic relations 
governed by private contracts has a paralysing effect on resistance because it hides the true 
relations of constraint which the contracts embody, making these contracts appear as the fruit 
of uncontrollable and impersonal forces offering no option but surrender. 
But one cannot opt for something that isn’t there. The problem facing most actual trading 
nations, above all the poorer ones, is to decide their relation to a world market which the 
WTO has transformed into a weapon against them. 
The choice on offer from the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF is liberalisation, that is, 
surrender. It means: 
(a) opening the domestic economy to demolition by the cheap products of the dominant 
powers regardless of the consequences for local environment and industry, with no 
reciprocal rights to sell into the advanced countries; 
(b) surrendering collectivised welfare provision in the interests of free competition; 
(c) dismantling all protection for people and lands which might be deemed in restraint of the 
free movement of capital; 
(d) dismantling all protection over conditions of work or pay; 
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(e) abandoning any public claims on the intellectual heritage of humanity. 
Resistance is not only feasible, but no other option is practical, as country after country 
discovers, usually to its cost. Ironically the countries held up as examples of market success  − 
the ‘Four Tigers’ − are now suffering its most destructive effects. On the other hand when an 
economy as small as Cuba has managed to hold out, against all the odds and for a remarkably 
long time, against the destruction of its social policies at the hands of the market, why should 
it be so difficult for any larger countries? 
The alternative in the first instance does not lie in the adoption of any economic nostrum but 
in re-asserting sovereign political rights of all humans over their own activities and their 
results: to decide for themselves how they will arrange their production, their welfare, their 
lands, their education, and their means of informing themselves.  
But this in turn requires a political effort, since it calls for an alliance with sufficient weight to 
counter the rich and powerful nations. The basis for such an alliance is not the imposition of a 
specific economic strategy or nostrum, since each nation needs the right to determine its own 
economic strategy. The basis for an alliance is the defence of this right itself: the placing of 
the right of economic self-determination squarely on the agenda of free and equal relations 
between peoples. 
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